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This thesis analyzes the national security laboratories under the leadership of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration and explores their role in U.S. nuclear 
modernization, finding that five of the eight labs could easily be repurposed to focus on 
the problem of climate change. The thesis begins by showing that U.S. spending on 
nuclear modernization is not only extremely wasteful, but also dangerous as it pressures 
other countries to pursue nuclear modernizations, thereby reversing the current 
trajectory of disarmament and starting a new arms race. Cutting many of these programs 
would save almost 300 billion dollars without affecting the United States' ability to 
deter nuclear aggression. This thesis demonstrates that repurposing these savings and 
the national laboratories could more than triple funding for climate change research. 
Three labs would be more than sufficient to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent for 
decades to come, which would allow the remaining five labs to utilize all of their 
resources to address climate change. The thesis finds that by shifting the mission of the 
laboratories, the labs would benefit the U.S. and the world by pursuing climate change 







I would like to thank Professor Jane Cramer for helping me to develop this 
thesis topic. Her constant guidance during the process of researching, writing, and 
editing this thesis was invaluable, and greatly deepened my understanding both of my 
topic and how best to present it. Professor Cramer’s classes were the ones I enjoyed the 
most during the course of my college career, and I am extremely grateful to have had 
the opportunity to work more closely with her on this thesis and several other research 
projects. 
Thank you to the rest of my thesis committee, Professor David Frank and John 
Valdez, for reading and editing this thesis. Your comments led to multiple changes in 
the substance and presentation of the thesis, and gave me several much-needed alternate 
perspectives.  
Thank you to the Honors College for providing me with a learning environment 
in which I was able to develop and grow over the last four years. 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Martin and Anja Erwig, for their 
unwavering support and encouragement throughout my entire life. Without them, I 






Table of Contents 
Introduction 1 
United States Nuclear Modernization 5 
The Triad 8 
Bombers 9 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 13 
Submarines 14 
Warhead Modernization 18 
Nuclear Modernization Threatens the Underpinnings of the NPT 21 
Russia 23 
China 25 
India and Pakistan 27 
France and the United Kingdom 29 
The U.S. Could Reverse Global Modernization Trends 31 
Key Conversion: The National Security Laboratories 33 
A New Manhattan Project 35 
Lab Descriptions 36 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 36 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 38 
Sandia National Laboratory 40 
Nevada National Security Site 41 
Pantex Plant 42 
Kansas City Plant 44 
Savannah River Site 45 
Y-12 National Security Complex 47 
Explaining the National Security Laboratories’ Drive for Modernized Nuclear 
Weapons 50 
Three Labs Are More Than Sufficient to Maintain Deterrence 52 
Repurposing the Labs for Climate Change Research Solves the Problem of Nuclear 








List of Figures  
Figure 1: Projected budget for the nuclear triad 2014-2023 8 
Figure 2: Estimated Nuclear-related costs of Bomber developments 11 
Figure 3: Estimated nuclear-related costs of ICBMs 14 
Figure 3: Estimated Nuclear-related costs of Submarine developments 16 
Figure 4: Comparison of interoperable warhead and LEP costs 19 










“The survival of the United States of America as we know it is at risk. And even 
more — if more should be required — the future of human civilization is at stake,” Al 
Gore said to an audience in Washington D.C. in 2008.1 He was referring not to 
terrorism or large-scale war, but to climate change. Climate change represents one of 
the greatest threats to the international community today, and has only increased in 
severity in the past several years. Without substantial new investments in climate 
change technologies, the effects of climate change will progress unchecked and cause 
significant damage both to the United States and to the rest of the world. The major 
challenge faced by climate change research currently is a lack of funding that hinders 
corporate and government research alike. Ideally, instead of coming from raising taxes, 
funding for research to address climate change could be secured by trimming already 
wasteful expenditures. An ideal place for these funds to come from is the funding 
currently allotted to the United States’ nuclear arsenal. The current arsenal is at the end 
of its planned life-cycle and the U.S. is gearing up for a full replacement of its Cold 
War nuclear triad by investing in new nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, submarines, and warheads. These planned modernizations include extensive 
unnecessary and wasteful expenditures that could easily be repurposed for climate 
change. Additionally, nuclear modernization programs are dangerous to international 
stability. As other nations see upgrades to the U.S. nuclear arsenal occurring, they are 
pressured to upgrade and replace their own arsenals, leading to a new nuclear arms race.  
                                                        




For the U.S. arsenal, there are two options for the nuclear stockpile with very 
different consequences. Nuclear modernization is the process of not only rebuilding our 
current deterrent force, but also making the new force much more accurate, and with 
smaller warheads. To other countries, such as Russia and China, this looks like the U.S. 
is newly preparing for nuclear war-fighting, and not simply replacing its deterrent force. 
By contrast, Life Extension Programs, seek to keep the existing nuclear arsenal reliable 
and secure by replacing components and repairing defects. Although nuclear 
modernization is discussed as simply making the U.S. arsenal “safe and more reliable”, 
it is clearly also an active attempt to change the makeup of the nuclear arsenal by 
adding either entirely new warheads or creating new launch platforms for those 
warheads. Not only is the process of nuclear modernization far more expensive than life 
extension, but it also prompts other countries to pursue nuclear modernizations in order 
to keep up with the changes in the United States’ arsenal. In the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union responded to numerical increases in the U.S. arsenal by increasing the size of its 
own arsenal because it perceived the changes in the United States’ arsenal as 
threatening. Although the United States is no longer building up numerically, 
modernization prompts a technological arms race in much the same way as a numerical 
build-up did in the Cold War. As other countries see the U.S. arsenal gaining new 
capabilities, other nations are clearly being compelled to upgrade their own arsenals 
with similar increased capabilities or even increase their number of weapons in order to 
counter the perceived threat of modernization. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the nuclear modernization programs of the 




racing that harms U.S. national security. Existing nuclear arsenals are more than 
sufficient to ensure that no nation will attempt a first strike with nuclear weapons, 
because even the existence of a single submarine ensures that unacceptable damage can 
be inflicted on an aggressor. In this thesis, I will first outline in detail the nuclear 
modernization programs being pursued by the United States and examine whether these 
programs are necessary for U.S. national security. Second, I demonstrate that the push 
for modernization is forcing other nations to spend vast resources on their own nuclear 
arsenals and increasing the likelihood of an accidental launch and nuclear conflict. 
Third, I show that the modernization initiatives impede the success of disarmament 
efforts and the viability of treaties regulating nuclear arsenals, threatening to unravel the 
progress that has been made in drawing down nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold 
War.  
Fourth, I analyze the eight national security laboratories in the United States that 
are part of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Complex 
and isolate their individual roles and interests in the continued modernization of the 
nuclear arsenal. Fifth, I argue that almost all of the funds planned to be used in 
modernization should be reallocated to climate change research where they could have a 
massive impact on one of the greatest threats facing the world, thus killing two birds 
with one stone. Halting most of the proposed nuclear modernization programs in the 
United States would free up the planned $271 billion over the next decade that could 
then be utilized for climate change research. This sum would be more than 23 times the 
$11.6 billion the United States spent on all climate change related issues in 2014.2  
                                                        
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office. This sum includes “technology to reduce emissions, science to 




Finally, I conclude by arguing that this shift of the labs towards climate change 
research would enable the United States to reverse the dangerous international trend 
towards modernized nuclear arsenals while simultaneously encouraging global 





United States Nuclear Modernization 
Politicians, military generals, and third-party analysts have repeatedly 
reaffirmed that nuclear weapons are usable only to punish an aggressor, and cannot be 
used to take territory from another nation. Because a nation with nuclear weapons 
always has the capability to completely destroy a nation that initiates a nuclear strike, 
there is no winning a nuclear war because both sides are annihilated. In the words of 
General Colin Powell, whose work with nuclear weapons spans multiple decades, “The 
one thing I convinced myself after all these years of exposure to the use of nuclear 
weapons is that they were useless. They could not be used.”3 Even President Ronald 
Reagan, whose administration expanded the military budget by 43% and revived the B-
1 Bomber Program, realized that  “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
fought. The only value in … possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never 
be used.”4 Given the existence of nuclear weapons, each nation’s objective should be to 
make nuclear conflict less likely and reduce the total number of nuclear weapons in 
existence. Treaties like New START and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have 
codified arms-reduction as a necessary step to securing a peaceful world, reflecting an 
international consensus about the function of these weapons. In order to be secure 
against potential nuclear aggression, a nation merely needs to maintain a secure second-
strike force that can inflict unacceptable damage against the aggressor. This does not 
require a massive arsenal of thousands of warheads. Numerous strategists have found 
that even after an all-out nuclear attack, an arsenal with only several hundred warheads 
is more than enough to ensure that any attacking nation would suffer unacceptable 
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losses in that each weapon could destroy a city, and no country could survive losing 
hundreds of cities. This is why most nuclear powers maintain an arsenal of around 200 
warheads; more warheads are simply irrelevant and serve no additional purpose. 
Although there is no longer a numerical nuclear arms race, U.S. nuclear 
modernization programs have prompted major nuclear powers to invest massive sums 
in more advanced nuclear weapons. While these weapons do nothing to actually change 
the landscape of nuclear deterrence, they do serve to halt the existing push towards arms 
control and reductions in nuclear arsenals. Modernization programs are not confined to 
a single nation and have even involved non-nuclear states in deployment patterns for 
nuclear-armed states. Importantly, while modernization by the United States prompts 
modernizations in other countries, these modernization programs do nothing to change 
the overall balance of nuclear deterrence. Regardless of how sleek or precise nuclear 
weapons become, even the most modernized arsenal cannot successfully neutralize 
another nation’s nuclear arsenal without that nation receiving unacceptable damage 
from a retaliatory strike. Just one nuclear submarine can carry around 200 warheads, 
and because these submarines are undetectable and constantly in motion, they serve as 
an unassailable deterrent. This means that nuclear modernization does not actually grant 
a nation the capability to conduct a first strike or change the balance of deterrence. 
However, nuclear modernization does prompt other nations to pursue similar 
modernizations because they perceive increased nuclear capabilities as necessitating a 
response. Matching the perceived capabilities of the United States becomes the 




deterrence. While modernization does not change the balance of the nuclear world, it 
does significantly affect the balances of each nation’s budget. 
The push for nuclear modernization is an expensive one, estimated to cost the 
United States at least 355 billion dollars over the next decade, with total costs 
potentially rising to over one trillion dollars over the next 30 years.5 While some 
spending is necessary to maintaining the safety and security of the existing nuclear 
arsenal, the current nuclear funding plan has increasingly drawn criticism for being 
excessive and serving no purpose for the national security of the United States. Life 
Extension Programs for the existing arsenal are estimated to cost around $2.5 billion per 
year, but modernization efforts will add at least $30 billion each year.6 Rather than 
pursuing cost-effective maintenance of current nuclear warheads and delivery systems, 
each branch of the U.S. military is modernizing and adding new capabilities to its 
arsenal. The 2011 Budget Control Act requires a minimum of $115 billion in defense 
cuts between fiscal years 2016 and 2019.7 The requirements set forth by this act have 
already prompted Congress to delay many of the proposed nuclear renovations and 
modifications until at least 2020 in order to meet near-term agreed spending reductions. 
While delaying expenses may be a convenient approach to alleviate the strain on the 
defense budget in the near future, it does not represent a long-term solution to the 
problems caused by exorbitantly expensive nuclear modernization programs.8 Rather 
than simply delay programs and worry about funding allocations at a later date, a far 
more prudent strategy is to realistically examine what components of the nuclear 
                                                        
5 Tom Z. Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal: Reducing the Costs of the Bloated U.S. Nuclear 
Stockpile,” Arms Control Association (2014): 2. 
6 Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal,” 3. 
7 Tom Z. Collina, “White House Reviewing Nuclear Budget,” Arms Control Today 44 (2014). 




program are necessary for U.S. national security and determine whether funding can be 
deployed in more efficient ways.  
 
Figure 1: Projected budget for the nuclear triad 2014-20239 
 
The Triad 
The United States maintains a three-part nuclear arsenal consisting of bombers, 
submarines, and land-based missiles. During the Cold War nuclear planners argued that 
each of the components of the triad was necessary in order to ensure the survivability of 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the event of a Soviet first strike. The entire nuclear arsenal 
today contains approximately 1,600 warheads deployed across the three parts of the 
                                                        




triad, with the New START Treaty dictating a further reduction to 1,550 warheads by 
2018.10 Responsibility for the nuclear arsenal is divided between the Air Force, the 
Navy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Air Force deals with land-
based missiles and bombers, the Navy with submarines and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and the NNSA handles warhead maintenance and production.11 I will 
proceed to examine the existing modernizations of each component of the nuclear 
arsenal and determine possible savings from cuts to these modernizations.  
 
Bombers  
The Air Force currently maintains 159 nuclear-capable bombers, although this 
number is slated to be reduced to 60 by 2018. The planned force in 2018 will include B-
2 and B-52 bombers and is estimated to be able to continue operating until at least 
2040.12 While this bomber fleet is still an active component of the U.S. nuclear triad it 
is not kept on high alert nor always equipped with nuclear weapons. Even as the relative 
importance of bombers in the nuclear triad is set to shrink, the Air Force is proposing 
the development of a new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) currently set to be 
produced starting in the early 2020s. This bomber would have the ability to fulfill both 
conventional missions as well as launch nuclear weapons, but essentially represents no 
upgrade to the existing bomber fleet. Existing bombers are just as capable of deploying 
the weaponry that the LRSB is being designed to use. The total cost of just future 
                                                        
10 Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal,” 2. 
11 Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal,” 2. 




research and development on the LRSB is estimated to be at least $25 billion, with 
production costs adding a minimum of $55 billion for a total of $80 billion.  
The development proposal for the LSRB runs counter to existing 
recommendations from the Office of Management and Budget, which found that “as a 
result of ongoing efforts to upgrade the existing bomber fleet with new electronic and 
weapons systems, current aircraft will be able to meet the threats expected in the 
foreseeable future.”13 Maintaining existing bomber forces and extending their 
operational capability would save $80 billion without undermining the Air Force’s 
capability to provide a credible second strike response force against potential 
aggressors.  The New START Treaty has as its goal the reduction of the total number of 
nuclear bombers. Currently, the Air Force plans to keep only 60 B-2 and B-52 bombers 
operational through 2040, which would represent a commitment to the treaty’s call for 
smaller bomber forces. With the production of the LSRB, however, the Air Force would 
add an additional 80-100 bombers to the nuclear bomber fleet.14 Even if all 60 B-2 and 
B-52s were phased out, the addition of the LSRBs would mean that the entire U.S. 
bomber fleet would see an increase in size and thus run counter to New START. 
Because the new bomber is unnecessary, expensive, and violates a treaty designed to 
reduce bomber forces, this program should be cut to save $80 billion.  
                                                        
13 Office of Management and Budget, “Terminations, Reductions, and Savings: FY2010 U.S. Budget,” 
(2009): 44. 





Figure 2: Estimated Nuclear-related costs of Bomber developments15 
Additionally, the Air Force has also pushed for the development of entirely new 
Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) for nuclear warheads at an estimated cost of 
$20 billion. The current ALCM maintained by the Air Force, the AGM-86B, has been 
kept operable through life extension programs (LEPs) far longer than the initial 
expected lifetime of ten years.16 In 2010, the Defense Department stated that it would 
soon evaluate whether or not to continue life-extension programs for ALCMs, develop a 
new ALCM, or cancel the program altogether.17 The function of ALCMs is to allow 
bombers to fire nuclear or conventional weapons at targets without having to penetrate 
air defenses. While air-defense penetration was highly important in the Cold War to 
bolster NATO against the Soviet Union in Europe, developments in missile technology 
and U.S. conventional superiority have made this an obsolete consideration.18 
                                                        
15 Todd Harrison and Evan B. Montgomery, “The Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave 
and Beyond,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2015): 16. 
16 Collina, “The Unaffortable Arsenal,” 11-12. 
17 William J. Perry and Andy Weber, “Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile,” The Washington Post 
(2015). 




In the event of a nuclear conflagration it would make no difference whether 
bombers dropped their payloads on their targets from above or shot them from a 
distance using cruise missiles. Because ALCMs can contain either conventional or 
nuclear warheads, they have a high potential to lead to accidental launches and 
miscalculations from other nuclear powers.19 Because any launched cruise missile could 
potentially constitute a nuclear attack the very existence of ALCMs fosters an 
international climate of fear that only serves to heighten tensions and increase the 
probability of an accidental nuclear launch. Currently, the only nations to deploy 
ALCMs are the U.S., Russia, and France, but other nuclear powers are on the path to 
developing nuclear-tipped cruise missiles as well.20 Rather than modernize its ALCMs 
and continue to risk miscalculation, the United States could do away with its existing 
ALCM force in order to secure a global ban on these weapons, and thereby also save a 
minimum of $20 billion.21  
Neither a bomber upgrade nor a new cruise missile should be pursued by the 
United States. Cutting both of these technologies would save at least $100 billion 
without any negative impact on national security. Existing bomber forces are perfectly 
capable of fulfilling the same functions that the LSRB would be purposed for and cruise 
missiles are an unnecessary technology that only serves to increase the risk of 
miscalculation. Pursuing life extension programs for the B-2 and B-52 bombers ensures 
a stable bomber-based leg of the triad at a fraction of the cost of the new bomber and 
cruise missile. 
                                                        
19 Perry and Weber, “Mr. President”. 
20 Perry and Weber, “Mr. President”. 




Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles  
The current ICBM force consists of 450 Minuteman III missiles located at three 
Air Force bases: F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, Malstrom Air Force Base in 
Montana, and Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.22 The Minuteman III missiles 
were deployed in the 1970s, and have been reliably maintained for more than 40 years 
through LEPs without any indication of instability or malfunction. Despite the 
effectiveness of the LEP for the Minuteman III, the Air Force is currently considering 
the development of an entirely new modernized missile that would serve as a 
replacement for the Minuteman III. This new missile represents an unnecessary 
investment with substantial financial and security repercussions. The cost of building an 
entirely new silo-based missile is estimated by a 2014 RAND study to be at least $84 
billion, with a new mobile missile costing at least $124 billion. Adding in the $3 billion 
per year that the RAND study estimates would be the minimum cost of maintaining the 
new missiles, the total price of developing and deploying a new silo-based missile over 
the next 40 years would be at least $204 billion. This sum could be two or three times as 
much as the estimated $60-90 billion cost of a life extension program for the 
Minuteman III over the same time period.23 Just the research and development stage for 
a new missile would cost virtually the same amount as keeping the existing arsenal 
reliable and secure. A newly modernized ICBM would not only provide no conceivable 
benefit to the U.S. nuclear strategy; it would also be prohibitively expensive.  
The most probable explanation for the proposed modernization of the ICBM 
force is that the Air Force wants to secure continued funding increases for its role in 
                                                        
22 Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal,” 14. 
23 Lauren Caston, et al, “The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force,” RAND 




maintaining the nuclear deterrent. The Air Force argues that developing a new ICBM is 
critical to ensure the survivability of ICBMs, because the new ICBMs will be capable of 
fitting in reinforced silos that protect them from a potential first strike. However, the 
2014 RAND study concluded that current silos provide adequate protection from 
attacks and are not at risk of being unable to launch their missiles in the event of a first 
strike.24 The study concluded that while a completely refurbished missile silo 
architecture might be desired by the Air Force, it is not a cost-effective or necessary 
course of action.25 
 
Figure 3: Estimated nuclear-related costs of ICBMs26 
Submarines 
The Navy’s component of the nuclear triad represents both the most expensive 
and the most secure part of the United States’ nuclear arsenal. U.S. submarines cannot 
be tracked by other nations once they are deployed and have the capability to deliver a 
first or second strike against any nuclear aggressor. The existing naval nuclear fleet 
                                                        
24 Caston, et al, “Future of the U.S. IBM Force,” 45-47. 
25 Caston, et al, “Future of the U.S. IBM Force,” 47. 




consists of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines with a potential capacity of 288 
Trident D5 submarine launched ballistic missiles. Each of these missiles has the 
potential to carry up to eight warheads, making each boat capable of carrying 192 
nuclear warheads. The Navy has also proposed building an entirely new class of nuclear 
submarine, the SSBN(X), while simultaneously retiring existing submarines beginning 
in 2027. The total cost of developing and building just twelve of the new submarines is 
projected to be at least $100 billion, with required refurbishments and upgrades 
bringing the total cost to $347 billion over their operational lifetime.27 The costs of both 
maintaining the existing submarine fleet for the next fifteen years and developing an 
entirely new class of ballistic missile submarine are staggering and cannot be contained 
within current budget constraints. The Navy has already requested additional funds for 
its submarine program from outside the naval budget by establishing the so-called “Sea-
Based Strategic Deterrence Fund”. This fund directly circumvents existing spending 
limits by externalizing the actual cost of building the new submarines.28 
This attempted funding reallocation reveals the unsustainable nature of the 
current nuclear modernization trajectory. The building of twelve new submarines and 
the progressive phasing out of existing subs is wasteful and entirely unnecessary. 
Submarine-based nuclear weapons are designed to provide an unassailable and secure 
second-strike force that can retaliate in the event that other U.S. nuclear forces are 
destroyed. This does not require submarines to be constantly deployed near potential 
threats in order to hold them “at-risk”, as current policy dictates.29 Rather, the Navy 
                                                        
27 Collina, “The Unaffordable Arsenal,” 7-8. 
28 Tom Z. Collina and Jacob Marx, “A Better Way to Buy Nuclear Submarines,” Breaking Defense 
(2015).  




could fulfill its role in the U.S. nuclear deterrent with eight total submarines, and deploy 
four at any given time.30 The only reason the Navy argues for twelve submarines is to 
have multiple submarines directly off the coast of Russia and China ready for a prompt 
strike.31 However, deploying submarines this close to the two countries is not necessary, 
because submarine-launched missiles have the potential to hit targets across the world.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated Nuclear-related costs of Submarine developments32 
Current modernization plans are overkill for the deterrence requirements of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal. No country has the ability to find even a single U.S. nuclear 
submarine when it is silent and submerged, much less four. While refurbishment and 
replacement programs could mean that some submarines are docked rather than out at 
sea, there would still be more than enough nuclear capability in the other parts of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter any potential aggressor during refurbishment periods. A 
smaller submarine fleet would still be able to field the same number of warheads that 
the current submarine fleet does, but would merely deploy these warheads on fewer 
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delivery vessels. The strategic value of nuclear submarines is not their ability to rapidly 
launch nuclear weapons but rather their invulnerability to a potential first strike from 
another country. Because there is currently no danger to the survivability of the U.S. 
nuclear submarine force in the foreseeable future a full modernization involving twelve 
new submarines and warhead upgrades is certainly excessive.33 In fact, it is widely 
believed that the twelve submarine modernization plan is largely a jobs program for 
Connecticut, which stands to benefit greatly from the production of these new 
submarines.34  
There are two potential cost-saving options when it comes to the submarine 
force. The first is to procure eight new Ohio replacements instead of twelve while 
phasing out the older Ohio class subs. This would save around $16 billion in 
procurement costs for the new submarines.35 A more aggressive plan would reject the 
new submarine procurement entirely, seeking only to use life extension programs for 
eight existing submarines for the foreseeable future. This would completely cut the 
$347 billion needed to procure and sustain the Ohio replacement over its lifetime. At 
the very least, the construction of the new submarines could be delayed until the older 
Ohio-class submarines are at risk of failing. A proposal that fails to construct any new 
submarines is unlikely to be successful however, as the Navy has already begun to plan 
for the phasing out of its existing submarines. Constructing only eight instead of twelve 
is the most realistic option. 
 
                                                        
33 Collina and Marx, “A Better Way to Buy Nuclear Submarines”. 
34 Travis Fain, “Bill: $46 million to draw 1,000 jobs, new sub program to Newport News,” Daily Press 
(2016). 





In order to outfit the new modernized nuclear force, the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) has proposed the “3+2” warhead program, which 
consists of interoperable warheads capable of being deployed on both SLBMs as well as 
ICBMs. These new interoperable warheads will use parts from multiple different 
warheads in the current arsenal that have never before been combined, which has 
prompted substantial concern about the safety of these combinations.36 Because testing 
of nuclear weapons is illegal under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, critics 
of the NNSA’s proposal argue that ensuring the safety of the new warheads would 
require breaching the treaty requirements and prompt other nations to test their own 
programs. Apart from safety and legal concerns, the development and implementation 
of an interoperable warhead program would cost substantially more than existing 
warhead life extension programs. The IW-1, the first of three proposed interoperable 
warheads, has a projected development cost of $11 billion while a life extension 
program for a single warhead in the Navy’s arsenal, the W76, costs only $5 billion. 
Development costs do not even take into account the production and outfitting of the 
existing arsenal, which means that the final cost of the IW-1 could be at least four times 
as much as pursuing a life extension program. Because of the high costs of developing 
even a single new series of interoperable warheads, Congress has already delayed the 
program by pushing the development of the IW-1 from 2025 to 2030.   
                                                        





Figure 4: Comparison of interoperable warhead and LEP costs37 
The former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Penrose 
Albright, has stated that the Navy would prefer to refurbish its W88 warhead in the 
same manner that it refurbished the W76 instead of adopting the IW-1. Albright also 
noted that consistent refurbishment programs by the Air Force and Navy serve to 
simplify the nuclear arsenal while constant reforms simply complicate nuclear 
strategy.38 Not only are the LEPs for existing warheads much easier to manage, but they 
are also far less expensive. If just the interoperable warhead program was cancelled in 
favor of continuing LEPs, the U.S. would stand to save $31 billion between 2014 and 
2039. LEPs would also remove any potential additional cost associated with retrofitting 
existing missiles with new interoperable warheads. This interoperable warhead program 
                                                        
37 Retrieved from Arms Control Association “NNSA’s ‘3+2’ Nuclear Warhead Plan Does Not Add Up”. 




represents an unnecessary expenditure that complicates the nuclear arsenal for no 
reason.  
The NNSA has also proposed a modernization program for the gravity bombs 
deployed by the Air Force, with its new B61-12 warhead designed to replace all of the 
existing B61 versions currently present in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The B61-12 is 
argued by the NNSA to represent a cost-effective consolidation of existing versions of 
the B61 into a single weapon that can accomplish all of the military objectives that the 
other versions of the B61 are currently used for.39 If this consolidation actually 
represented savings for the nuclear arsenal, it would be a reasonable proposal. However, 
the actual costs of the B61-12 are drastically different from the NNSA’s projections. 
Each B61-12 costs $28.9 million, more than twice its weight in gold. The estimated cost 
of the entire B61-12 program is $11.6 billion dollars, more than the total defense 
spending of countries like Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland.40 In comparison, an LEP 
for existing versions of the B61 would cost only $5 billion, representing a savings of 
over $6 billion. There is no indication that the refurbished B61-12 would serve any 
purpose other than to waste money on an essentially cosmetic upgrade to existing B61s. 
This program should be cut in favor of LEPs for existing B61s. 
If the maximum proposed cuts are made to each modernization proposal, total 
savings could be at least $271 billion dollars. This number assumes that the only 
modernization that is pursued is the construction of eight new Ohio class submarines, 
with all other programs being either cut or replaced by LEPs.  
 
                                                        
39 Hans M. Kristensen, “Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb Increase Further,” Strategic Security Blog 
(2013).  




Nuclear Modernization Threatens the Underpinnings of the NPT 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970 with the 
purpose of regulating nuclear arsenals. This treaty prohibits all nations except those 
with existing nuclear weapons from developing a nuclear arsenal and calls on existing 
nuclear states to reduce their nuclear arsenals with the ultimate goal of complete 
disarmament.41 The recent conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference in May 2015 brought with it a reaffirmation of the international consensus 
that nuclear weapons should be reduced and ultimately phased out of existence.42 
However, the existing trajectory of modernization across the world indicates that this 
consensus has not led to actual implementation; every nuclear weapon state is beginning 
to escalate modernization efforts and there is no sign of the disarmament that the NPT 
calls for.43 Additionally, other non-nuclear countries have been drawn into this process 
of modernization. The U.S. has involved non-nuclear nations in its nuclear defense 
program by stationing nuclear weapons in multiple NATO member states that do not 
have nuclear arsenals of their own. This directly violates the NPT Treaty which states 
that non-nuclear NPT signatories are obligated “not to receive the transfer from any 
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly”.44 A 2015 report 
by the Reaching Critical Will project illustrates that every nuclear power is pursuing 
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modernization programs, largely due to the continued refusal of the U.S. and Russia to 
commit to an international regime culminating in the elimination of nuclear weapons.45 
In the following sections, I will examine the modernization programs being 
pursued by major nuclear powers around the world. In each instance, I will argue that 
the modernization efforts of the United States discussed earlier are directly responsible 
for the modernization of other arsenals. After illustrating the relationship between U.S. 
modernization and other modernization efforts, I argue that the U.S. has the potential to 
reverse this trend by changing its own posture on modernization and setting an example 
for the rest of the world. 
                                                        





Figure 5: Table of nuclear modernization programs46 
Russia 
In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would pursue 
a series of nuclear modernizations in order to counter emerging global threats; a thinly 
veiled reference to current U.S. modernization programs. Russia’s current 
modernization plan includes 400 new ICBMs, a fleet of eight new strategic nuclear 
                                                        




submarines, and preliminary development of a modernized long-range nuclear bomber. 
It is no coincidence that these modernizations mirror those proposed by the United 
States. Russian modernizations represent an attempt to possess the same technology and 
number of warheads as the United States.47 Russian statements on nuclear arms 
reductions consistently emphasize that Russia will follow the U.S. on arms control 
measures, but will not reduce its number of warheads or delivery systems without a 
corresponding U.S. reduction.48 Additionally, the Russian government presents its 
current modernization programs to the public as an essential component of maintaining 
Russia’s strength given U.S. modernization.49  
The similarity of Russian modernization programs to their U.S. counterparts as 
well as the justifications presented by the Russian government for pursuing 
modernization seem to indicate that the primary driver of Russian nuclear 
modernization is the United States’ own modernization program. Total Russian military 
modernization plans are projected to cost over $700 billion starting in 2018, with a 
minimum of $70 billion likely allocated for nuclear modernization programs.50 Despite 
the exorbitant price tag that this modernization will have, the Russian government 
continues to pursue a modernized arsenal to counter the U.S. buildup. Given recent 
international tensions over Crimea, a unilateral halt to modernization in Russia seems 
out of the question as long as U.S. modernization continues. 
 
                                                        
47 Atcheson, et al, “Assuring destruction forever,” 14. 
48 Atcheson, et al, “Assuring destruction forever,” 69. 
49 Atcheson, et al, “Assuring destruction forever,” 70. 





Since its inception as a nuclear power in 1964, China has pursued a minimal 
nuclear deterrent strategy and has consistently been very transparent about the intent 
behind its nuclear arsenal. China is the only nuclear weapon state under the terms of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that has pledged to never be the first to utilize nuclear 
weapons, and it has reaffirmed this commitment in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, and again 
in 2011.51  Chinese leaders have also continuously emphasized China’s policy of 
minimum deterrence, which is designed to absorb a first strike and still have sufficient 
retaliatory potential to inflict damage on enemy cities. The 2010 Chinese Defense 
White Paper states that China will never enter into a nuclear arms race with another 
nation since such an arms race would not be conducive to China’s nuclear policy.52 
Chinese actions on the international stage regarding arms reduction talks have been very 
much in line with the PRC’s nuclear policy, with Chinese officials seeking deep global 
reductions in arms 
China has historically maintained a very small arsenal designed for “minimum 
deterrence”. According to Chinese officials, only ten warheads need to be capable of 
hitting targets in another country in order to deter that country from launching a first 
strike against China.53 This posture has led China to maintain one of the smallest 
arsenals in the world, with estimates putting China’s total nuclear missile stockpile at 
around 200.54  
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China has increased its total warhead count over the last fifteen years, and has 
recently begun modernizing its delivery systems and weapons. With the nuclear 
material that it possesses, China has the potential to field close to seven hundred nuclear 
warheads.55 The current estimate of new production puts the number of new warheads 
produced by China each year at between ten and twenty. To ensure the survivability of 
its nuclear force, China has also invested in mobile missile technology and reinforced 
launching sites.56 Recent upgrades to Chinese missiles have focused on improving 
launch times by replacing liquid fuels in the missiles with solid fuel. The Chinese land-
based nuclear arsenal is being modernized with an increased focus on multiple 
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) as well as maneuverable re-entry 
vehicles.57 MIRV technology would ensure that the survival of even a very small part of 
the Chinese land based arsenal would be sufficient to cause unacceptable damage to an 
aggressor and make it more difficult to conduct a first strike that eliminates most of 
China’s nuclear capabilities. The most significant change in the Chinese arsenal has 
been the recent deployment of multiple nuclear-armed submarines. China previously 
only operated a single Xia-class submarine until it completed the construction of three 
Jin-class submarines in 2014.58 The deployment of more submarines seems to indicate 
that China is highly concerned about the survivability of its arsenal and believes that 
more delivery platforms are necessary to ensure its minimum deterrence posture.  
Chinese modernization is very much a response to the modernization efforts of 
the United States. Many Chinese officials perceive the new weapons that the U.S. is 
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building as an attempt to develop a usable first-strike force that could destroy China’s 
capability to retaliate.59 Given this perception, it makes sense that China would pursue 
modernization efforts designed to increase the size of its arsenal as well as ensure that 
some of its nuclear forces would be able to survive a potential first strike. Even though 
U.S. modernizations would not actually increase the viability of a first strike on China, 
it appears to the Chinese government that gearing up for a first strike is the justification 
behind proposed modernizations. China’s official stance on disarmament also indicates 
that it sees the United States’ modernization programs as necessitating Chinese 
modernizations. China has stated that it would follow the U.S. and Russia on 
disarmament policies, but refuses to do so while the U.S. and Russia pursue 
modernization.60 This demonstrates that U.S. modernization is at the heart of the 
upgrades being made to the Chinese arsenal.  
 
India and Pakistan  
The tensions between China and the U.S. over nuclear forces have prompted 
increased modernization efforts in both India and Pakistan. India is pursuing a nuclear 
triad much like the U.S., with the development of the new Agni-V missile and the 
expansion of the Indian nuclear reactor complex indicating a drive for a modernized 
nuclear arsenal.61 India’s nuclear program has been developing more advanced 
weaponry that can target population centers in China, indicating that India sees China’s 
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nuclear program as a growing threat.62 The development of new submarines illustrate 
India’s concerns about the survivability of its arsenal and also likely represent an 
attempt to maintain parity with China’s submarine force.63  
In response to the modernization efforts of India, Pakistan is developing nuclear 
cruise missile technology and more accurate medium-range solid-fueled missiles, which 
would dramatically reduce the time necessary to launch a nuclear strike.64 Pakistan’s 
arsenal has also seen a numerical increase from around 100 nuclear weapons in 2011 to 
over 130 by the end of 2014.65 This increase is believed by many experts to represent a 
continued effort to achieve parity with India’s nuclear forces.66 Pakistan’s government 
uses this logic to justify spending on modernization to its people, who have long seen 
Pakistan’s nuclear program as a symbol of pride as well as a critical defense against 
potential aggression by India.67 However, its extreme spending on modernization has 
made Pakistan greatly dependent on international humanitarian aid in order to alleviate 
economic hardship.68  
Modernization in India and Pakistan is directly linked to modernization in the 
U.S. and China. As China has been forced to modernize its arsenal in response to U.S. 
efforts, India has felt the need to develop its arsenal to remain on par with China. 
India’s modernization has then prompted Pakistan to modernize its own arsenal to 
match India’s arsenal. This cascading effect begins with the United States, and 
illustrates the ripple effects that modernization has on security relationships between 
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multiple countries. Neither Pakistan nor India would have a reason to modernize their 
arsenals if it were not for Chinese modernization, which results from the United States’ 
expansion of its own modernization programs.  
 
France and the United Kingdom 
Despite being allied with the United States and having security agreements 
regarding nuclear attacks, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel are also marching 
down the costly path to a modernized nuclear arsenal. France is pursuing a new nuclear 
submarine and is continuing to develop its force of air launched cruise missiles, with a 
modernized bomber (the Rafale) already beginning to replace the existing bomber 
force.69 France’s 2015 budget included $3.4 billion for nuclear weapons activities, 
around one-third of its total defense budget.70 Even though this sum pales in 
comparison to U.S. efforts in terms of total cost, the U.S. spends nowhere near one-third 
of its total defense budget on nuclear weapons. France’s allocation of its defense budget 
demonstrates that it views nuclear weapons as a critical component of its national 
security. President Hollande’s 2015 statement on the nuclear arsenal reaffirmed the 
importance of nuclear weapons, and indicated that France has no intention of reducing 
its 300 warhead arsenal as long as the U.S. and Russia remain on their current trajectory 
of modernization.71 
The United Kingdom also has no intention of drastically reducing its nuclear 
arsenal. One senior Conservative Member of Parliament argued that Britain should 
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retain its nuclear arsenal because leaving “France as the only nuclear power in Europe 
would be a reckless piece of irresponsibility”.72 Not only is the U.K. maintaining its 
current nuclear arsenal, it is also proposing new modernizations to both warheads and 
its submarine forces. The new Mk4A warhead is designed to replace existing warheads 
in the U.K.’s arsenal as well as be deployed on its new submarines. These new 
submarines are designed as a replacement for the existing Trident submarines used by 
the U.K.73 The cost of three to four new ballistic missile submarines is estimated to be 
$100 billion over their operational lifetime.74 This investment indicates that the U.K. is 
continuing to emphasize its nuclear force as a central component of its national security, 
and is unlikely to reduce its forces in the near future.  
Both France and the U.K. see other modernization programs as justifications for 
continuing to improve their own arsenals. The comments of officials in both countries 
indicate that any potential reductions to nuclear arsenals would necessitate a 
corresponding reduction by the U.S. and Russia. Furthermore, modernizations to 
submarines in the U.K. and to bombers in France are very similar to the modernizations 
made by the United States. These similarities likely indicate a desire for technological 
parity with the U.S. as well as an increased focus on secure deterrent forces. As long as 
the United States continues its focus on modernization and spurs Russia to modernize 
its arsenal, France and Britain will continue to upgrade their arsenals in similar ways. 
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The U.S. Could Reverse Global Modernization Trends 
The fact that every nuclear-armed nation is currently in the process of 
modernizing their nuclear arsenals indicates that the commitment to continual arms 
reductions and eventual disarmament made by nuclear powers in the NPT are not 
leading to the global nuclear reductions that the treaty envisioned. Rather, nuclear-
armed states are now going in the wrong direction, spending billions on modernization 
programs and increases in nuclear stockpiles that run counter to the NPT.  
As illustrated above, the U.S. modernization programs are the primary driver of 
global nuclear modernization efforts. Because of its role in prompting modernization, 
the U.S. needs to be the country that takes the lead on reversing the current trajectory of 
modernization. If U.S. modernization were to cease, Russia and China would no longer 
be motivated to modernize their own arsenals. This in turn would likely halt 
modernization in India, Pakistan, France, and Britain, as each of these countries justifies 
its modernization programs through the existence of other such programs. Every 
modernization effort can be traced back to the United States’ modernization, which 
makes halting the U.S. modernization effort a pre-requisite to stopping modernization in 
every other country. 
Nuclear modernization in the United States prompts global arms races and 
irresponsible expenditures that detract from the welfare of citizens in every nation. In 
order to address U.S. nuclear modernization, it is necessary to examine the 
organizational impetus behind modernization efforts. The primary organization 
responsible for the U.S. trajectory of modernization is the National Nuclear Security 




weapon in the U.S. arsenal. This means that the NNSA and its laboratories have a stake 
in every modernization program. Addressing the national security laboratories thus 





Key Conversion: The National Security Laboratories 
The NNSA maintains eight national security laboratories in order to manage the 
United States’ nuclear stockpile and sustain current modernization efforts. These labs 
are split into three distinct categories by the NNSA: national nuclear weapons design 
laboratories—the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, 
one testing site—the Nevada National Security Site, and production plants—the Pantex 
Plant, Kansas City Plant (now better known as the National Security Campus), the 
Savannah River Site, and Y-12 National Security Complex. The current funding 
proposal for 2016 allocates $12.6 billion to the entire national security laboratory 
complex and represents an increase of 10.2% over the 2015 funding levels.75 This 
proposal represents the highest level ever of U.S. spending on nuclear weapons 
activities in absolute dollars ($8.84 billion). Current NNSA plans call for maintaining 
all eight national laboratories and having each lab continue to focus on nuclear weapons 
activities. Unless these plans are changed they will necessitate budget increases for the 
NNSA until at least 2040 given the current trajectory of modernization.76 If the existing 
modernization proposals are implemented, NNSA funds will continue to be used at the 
laboratories to develop new weaponry for the nuclear arsenal and upgrade existing 
components. 
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The NNSA argues that each laboratory fulfills a specific part of the nuclear 
weapons maintenance program that cannot be successfully performed at any other site 
and that a consolidation of the sites would represent a threat to the proper functioning of 
the nuclear arsenal. In order to determine the necessity of each site’s role in the 
maintenance of the nuclear stockpile each site will be examined individually. It is 
important to note that effective maintenance of the stockpile and modernization are two 
distinct goals. A consolidation plan that manages to keep the United States’ deterrent 
secure but does not allow for modernization would be a viable option given the danger 
that a modernized arsenal presents to the international community. 
 
Lab Name Employees Budget (in 
billions) 
Approximate Weapons 















10,700 $1.8  $1.5 Sandia Corporation 
Nevada National 
Security Site 
1,900 $0.396  $0.244 National Security 
Technologies, LLC 
Pantex Plant 3,600 $0.604  $0.602 Consolidated Nuclear 
Security, LLC 















A New Manhattan Project 
The national laboratories were originally created to fulfill the goal of the 
Manhattan Project; namely to create a weapon that would be capable of winning World 
War II for the United States. This project involved many of the best scientists and 
engineers in the U.S. all working together towards a common goal that was essential 
during the war. Because the labs all had this shared goal that unified and motivated 
them, they were incredibly effective at fulfilling the objective of the Manhattan Project. 
Today, there is no longer the same project driving the labs. Each lab currently attempts 
to maintain itself as an organization and secures funding by justifying spending on new 
nuclear weapons that do nothing to actually contribute to U.S. national security. Instead, 
these new projects waste resources and provoke other states to build new nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Rather than be used to continue this outdated Cold War mission, 
these national security labs need to be repurposed for a new Manhattan Project. 
The stagnant and outdated mission that the labs are currently pursuing must be 
changed in order to recapture the same productive power that the labs harnessed during 
the Manhattan Project. In order to be positive agents in U.S. policy, the labs need a new 
Manhattan Project that is directed at one of the major challenges facing the U.S. today. 
As the following descriptions of the labs will demonstrate, the labs are already well-
suited to pursue the problem of climate change. All that is required is a shift in the 
overall mission of the labs in order to orient them in this manner. While the labs 
currently depend on nuclear modernizations in order to keep their resources, a new 
Manhattan Project would enable the labs to abandon these projects without losing any 





Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos was one of the first labs founded in order to conduct research for 
the Manhattan Project during World War II. Because of the difficulty of coordinating a 
secret project across many different universities and locations across the country the 
leaders of the Manhattan Project decided to establish a centralized location for the 
development and testing of nuclear weapons.77 With the end of World War II and after 
the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Los Alamos shifted to the 
development of thermonuclear weapons and rapidly expanded the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
While the University of California was responsible for managing Los Alamos until 
2003, the Department of Energy then opened the management contract to other bidders, 
including private firms. In 2006, the lab’s management was taken over by Los Alamos 
National Security, LLC, a for-profit corporation including the University of California 
as well as the Bechtel Corporation, Washington Group International, and the Babcock 
and Wilcox Technical Services Group.78 Since 2006 other bidders have not had an 
opportunity to attempt to take over, entrenching Los Alamos National Security, LLC as 
the management of Los Alamos for the foreseeable future. Los Alamos employs 7,430 
workers and has a total yearly budget of $2.1 billion, two-thirds of which is dedicated to 
nuclear weapons activities.79 
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Ever since its inception Los Alamos has been a unique site for nuclear weapons 
research and production. It possesses the only fully functioning plutonium pit 
manufacturing facility in the nuclear weapons complex, the Plutonium Facility-4. 
Plutonium pits are the core of any nuclear weapon, and serve to initiate the 
thermonuclear reaction that gives these weapons their destructive potential. Despite the 
commitment by the United States to reduce and retire its nuclear arsenal, the future role 
for Los Alamos envisioned by the NNSA emphasizes pit production capabilities and 
weapons testing while phasing out current environmental impact studies and waste 
disposal efforts at the site designed to minimize the environmental impact of that 
expansion.80 The most expensive construction proposal at Los Alamos is the Chemistry 
and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility, which would enable the production of 
more plutonium pits for the nuclear arsenal. Because of the excessive costs and unclear 
benefit of such a facility, the Obama administration has already delayed construction for 
a minimum of five years. The fact that the CMRR Facility would enable more 
plutonium pits to be produced indicates that it would likely be used to expand the 
nuclear arsenal rather than to continue decreasing its total size.81 An emphasis on pit 
production facilities demonstrates that the NNSA intends to continue constructing 
additional nuclear weapons instead of relying on existing ones, as new plutonium pits 
have no function other than to be deployed in new nuclear warheads. 
Los Alamos is also the lab most interested in refurbishing and modernizing the 
B61 bomb as it was responsible for the initial development of fifteen different versions 
of the B61 that were then adopted by the military. Los Alamos became responsible for 
                                                        
80 Civiak, et al, “Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture,” 53-54. 
81 Peter Stockton, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Energy Department Plans to Waste Billions of 




the development of the weapon shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, and over the 
course of the next 50 years it continued to propose additional modifications and extra 
versions of the B61. Los Alamos argued that each new upgrade was necessary for the 
fulfillment of a specific nuclear mission and had a critical role to play in the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent.82 This close connection to the B61 makes it highly plausible that Los 
Alamos has a vested interest in pursuing the B61-12 modernization program, as this 
would provide continued funding and a justification for the development of new nuclear 
weapons under the current U.S. nuclear trajectory.  
 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was the second lab created to 
oversee the design of nuclear weapons. Its primary mission was to serve as a competitor 
for weapons designers at Los Alamos in order to maximize the push for innovation at 
both laboratories. Livermore developed the initial version of a submarine-launched 
ballistic missile and spearheaded the creation of the first warheads for MIRVed 
missiles. The current mission of the lab is to maintain and test its developed warheads 
(the W62 and W87 ICBM warheads as well as the W84 ground-launched cruise missile) 
and to spearhead the life extension program for the W78 warhead that was originally 
designed at Los Alamos.83 Livermore was managed by the University of California but 
in 2007 was subject to a shift in management to Lawrence Livermore National Security, 
LLC (consisting of the Bechtel Corporation, Babcock and Wilcox, Washington Division 
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of URS Corporation, and Battelle Memorial Institute).84 The budget for Lawrence 
Livermore in 2013 was $1.19 billion, 82% ($981 million) of which was earmarked for 
weapons activities. Livermore currently has 6,800 employees.85  
Lawrence Livermore houses the so-called “Superblock” site, which in addition 
to Los Alamos is one of the only two sites that store plutonium and weapons-grade 
uranium. While the NNSA proposed transferring all plutonium to Los Alamos in order 
to consolidate nuclear materials, the delays in constructing the replacement facilities at 
Los Alamos have hampered this process. This delay raises substantial security concerns 
as Livermore failed a security test in 2008, in which mock attackers were able to 
successfully infiltrate the compound and acquire enough plutonium to construct a dirty 
bomb.86 The proximity of Livermore’s location to highly populated areas in San 
Francisco makes the potential theft of nuclear materials at the site especially 
problematic, as 7 million people live within 50 miles of the facility. Even disregarding 
the possibility of theft, Livermore already has negative effects on the environment with 
the EPA placing all of Livermore’s sites on the Superfund list of contaminated sites 
requiring immediate cleanup.87 The first priority at Livermore should be ensuring that 
the existing facilities do not cause continued environmental damage, not modernizing 
weapons while allowing this environmental damage to be exacerbated.  
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Sandia National Laboratory 
The Sandia National Laboratory was created to manage production requirements 
for the nuclear weapons designed by Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. For this 
reason, it has two locations, one near Los Alamos and one in Livermore, California.88 
After the moratorium on new nuclear testing in 1992 Sandia became responsible for 
maintaining the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile through non-explosive 
experiments. While Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore handle the nuclear warheads 
Sandia is responsible for the non-nuclear components of warheads and pairing warheads 
with their nuclear delivery systems.89 With its 10,700 employees, Sandia deals with 
miniature electronics and precise systems for nuclear weapons while simultaneously 
conducting research and development into new forms of high explosives. Sandia’s 
budget in 2014 was $1.8 billion, with approximately $1.5 billion being allocated for the 
production and maintenance of weapons systems. Sandia is managed by the Sandia 
Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin.90  
Sandia is fundamentally connected to the life extension programs for existing 
warheads, as it produces non-nuclear components for all warhead classes. Successful 
life extension programs conducted by Sandia include the development of a refurbished 
W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile which involved modifying key components 
of the warhead to ensure reliability and durability in a number of firing conditions. Most 
of the recent LEP funding to Sandia has now been re-allocated for the development of 
the B61-12 which has led to delays in the refurbishment of other weapons in the nuclear 
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arsenal.91 In addition to developing new bomb systems Sandia is also pursuing life 
extension programs for the W78 ICBM and W88 SLBM, with many of the components 
developed for each of the warheads having the potential of being used in an 
interoperable warhead on both ICBMs and SLBMs. While Sandia has consistently 
ensured the reliability of existing warheads it is important to ensure that the mission of 
refurbishment does not overlap with the development of modernized delivery vehicles 
or increased usability of the nuclear arsenal. As the B61-12 illustrates, new 
modernization programs require a shift away from LEPs and thus threaten the reliability 
of the current nuclear arsenal.  
 
Nevada National Security Site 
The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) had always been a primary large-
scale nuclear testing ground for the United States until the signing of the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty made the NNSS the only permitted site for U.S. nuclear testing. Despite the 
absence of large nuclear tests the isolated location of the NNSS makes it a perfect 
testing ground for components of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The NNSS has been used 
primarily to conduct subcritical tests for existing parts of the nuclear arsenal in recent 
years, but also contains facilities designed to assemble and disassemble nuclear 
weapons.92 The Big Explosives Experimental Facility is the largest nuclear testing site 
in the facility and is capable of testing explosions up to 70,000 lbs of TNT. Besides its 
contribution to maintaining the nuclear stockpile the NNSS houses the National 
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Criticality Experiments Research Center, which is designed to facilitate research into 
the detection and monitoring of radiation for non-proliferation efforts.93 
The 2014 fiscal year budget request by the NNSA reflects the site’s dual role in 
weapons management and non-proliferation efforts, with the total budget of $396 
million divided into $244 million for weapons activities and $110 million for nuclear 
non-proliferation programs. Managing the site and its 1,900 employees is National 
Security Technologies, LLC, a partnership consisting of Northrup Grumman, AECOM, 
CH2M Hill, and Nuclear Fuel Services (a subsidiary of Babcock and Wilcox).94 The 
NNSA has proposed using the NNSS to accelerate the disassembly of parts of the 
nuclear stockpile as existing dismantling facilities are overstretched. The NNSS’s 
Device Assembly Facility is well designed for disassembly as recent expansions have 
made the facility capable of disposing of dirty bombs and assembled nuclear weapons 
from terrorists. Excess plutonium could also be stored at the Device Assembly Facility, 
with a DOE study estimating that the site could allow for the storage of 8,000 pits.95 
This would make the proposed upgraded facilities at Los Alamos for plutonium storage 
unnecessary and reduce the funding required to maintain plutonium storage sites at 
multiple facilities.  
 
Pantex Plant 
The Pantex Plant is the only facility at which the NNSA officially conducts 
nuclear weapons assembly. While the Nevada National Security Site has recently taken 
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over some of the nuclear arsenal’s disassembly programs the Pantex Plant remains the 
main site at which all of the components of nuclear weapons are either put together or 
broken down. Pantex is responsible for LEPs as well as the replacement of existing 
warheads and components with modernized versions.96 The LEPs conducted by the 
Pantex Plant currently include the W87 and W76 warheads as well as multiple versions 
of the B61 bomb. While developing new technologies and parts for the nuclear arsenal 
the Pantex Plant has neglected hundreds of thousands of older unusable component 
parts that will never again be needed in the nuclear arsenal.97 Instead of cleaning up 
these older components and reducing the footprint of the facility the NNSA is planning 
to build several additional facilities (the High Explosive Component Fabrication and 
Qualification Facility as well as a new high explosive pressing facility) to facilitate the 
continued upgrading of the high explosive parts of the nuclear arsenal.  
The Pantex Plant had 3,600 employees and a $604 million budget in 2014. The 
NNSA’s budget breakdown indicates that essentially the entire budget ($602 million) is 
allocated for weapons activities. Pantex was maintained by a branch of Babcock and 
Wilcox until a new contract bidding process by the NNSA awarded a management 
contract to Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (consisting of Bechtel and Lockheed 
Martin) for the management of both the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 site.98 The NNSA 
has argued that this consolidation will save more than $1 billion over the next ten years. 
However, the protest of two rival contractors has delayed the NNSA’s contract 
transition for both Pantex and Y-12. Even with these management concerns Pantex has 
continued its dismantlement program for existing warheads. The Pantex Plant is also 
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one of the sites that works directly with plutonium pits, and its program of reusing 
plutonium pits potentially providing a more environmentally-friendly avenue to 
refurbish warheads without requiring the production of any new pits from other labs.99 
Plutonium pit disassembly would be an ideal mission for Pantex to pursue with its 
funding instead of building facilities capable of modernizing the nuclear arsenal. 
 
Kansas City Plant 
The Kansas City Plant is the only site that has seen a comprehensive modern 
overhaul when it finished the move from its previous location to the newly constructed 
National Security Campus in 2014. This shift did not affect the production 
responsibilities or tasks of the Kansas City Plant however, with the Plant continuing to 
be responsible for the production of “a wide range of mechanical, electronic, 
electromechanical, metal, and plastic components.”100 These parts are used for LEPs of 
existing warheads and the replacement of specific aging components in nuclear 
warheads. While the plant continues to produce these new components it also houses 
hundreds of thousands of unusable and outdated spare non-nuclear parts of the nuclear 
arsenal which have not been slated for cleanup or removal.101 The Kansas City Plant has 
no nuclear material on site and thus its 2,500 workers are exclusively tasked with 
building new non-nuclear components for nuclear maintenance. In 2014, the NNSA 
requested $579 million for the Kansas City Plant, with $562 million of this total 
allocated to weapons activities at the site. Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and 
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Technologies is responsible for management at the site in Kansas. Honeywell also 
simultaneously maintains a “Los Alamos Office” which produces detonator triggers for 
the nuclear arsenal.102  
While the Kansas City Plant’s new location at the National Security Campus is 
smaller and has less of an environmental impact than the last site did, the old location 
has been cited as posing an environmental concern as there have been no funds 
allocated for cleanup of the site by the NNSA.103 Additionally, the transition to a new 
site has brought with it an outsourcing of some manufacturing responsibilities to the 
commercial sector. As part of the reduction in size of the facility outsourcing is 
estimated to increase from 54 to 70 percent. This has drawn criticism from the 
Government Accountability Office which argues that outsourcing the production of 
sensitive components could pose higher proliferation risks because these components 
could be leaked to other countries or potential aggressors.104 While the reduction of 
costs at the new National Security Campus can be applauded, the environmental impact 
of the old site and potential risks associated with outsourcing the manufacturing of 
sensitive components pose a grave threat and must be addressed.  
 
Savannah River Site 
The Savannah River Site is the largest NNSA-maintained nuclear site, taking up 
over 300 square miles of land and employing 12,000 workers.105 The site is operated by 
Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC which consists of the Fluor Corporation, 
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Northrup Grumman, and Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and Technologies.106 
Throughout most of its history this site has been responsible for producing usable 
radioactive materials for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, specifically plutonium-239 and 
tritium. The Savannah River Site is still responsible for maintaining tritium levels in 
existing warheads and performs reliability tests on the tritium-injection systems that 
boost warhead yields. While this part of the Savannah River Site’s function still 
contributes to NNSA stockpile maintenance the primary mission of the Savannah River 
Site has been environmental cleanup of its own waste products. The site houses 37 
million gallons of radioactive waste produced from its past production of radioactive 
materials. The cleanup efforts at the site itself have already cost tens of billions of 
dollars and the classification of the Savannah River Site as a Superfund location 
indicates the severity of its environmental impact.107 In 2014, the NNSA requested $1.4 
billion for the site and allocated $1.2 billion to environmental cleanup efforts.108  
The dramatic continued costs of cleanup have delayed construction of several 
facilities designed to convert excess plutonium to plutonium-uranium mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel capable of being used in commercial nuclear reactors. The MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility is currently under construction and was originally slated for 
completion in 2016, but the NNSA has pushed back the date to at least 2019. Budgeting 
for the Savannah River Site reflects the NNSA’s de-prioritization of this project: 
funding for the MOX facility fell from $438 million in 2013 to $320 million in 2014. 
Construction on the Fuel Fabrication Facility started in 2007 and was estimated to cost 
at most $1 billion for construction with operating costs of $156 million per year. This 
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turned out to be a highly conservative estimate as costs have skyrocketed to over $7.7 
billion for construction and more than $500 million for operating costs. Even if the 
facility were completed on time there are currently no commercial reactors outfitted to 
use the new MOX fuel, with an existing test by Duke Energy indicating that this fuel 
poses new safety risks to the maintenance of existing reactors.109 Additionally, the fuel 
would create new non-proliferation risks as separated plutonium from the fabricated 
MOX fuel could conceivably be used to create a nuclear weapon. The NNSA has 
largely ignored these concerns and has instead proposed additional facilities at the 
Savannah River Site to facilitate the successful transition to the production of MOX 
fuel.110 With existing cleanup and construction efforts already significantly behind 
schedule, however, it is highly likely that large stores of plutonium will simply remain 
in storage at the facility.111 With existing cleanup efforts already dramatically over 
budget it does not make sense to continue investing in a facility that has little chance of 
producing a commercially viable fuel source and will only lead to insecure plutonium 
reserves.  
 
Y-12 National Security Complex 
The Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee is the site at which most of 
the highly enriched uranium used in the U.S. nuclear arsenal is stored and processed for 
use in warheads. This means that Y-12 is closely involved in every life extension 
program with the site and its 4,600 workers already having refurbished the W87 ICBM, 
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B61-7, and B61-11 nuclear bombs as well as the W76 SLBM. While the site has 
multiple additional stated missions including the prevention of nuclear proliferation and 
down-blending of highly enriched uranium, 96 percent of the 2014 $1.2 billion budget 
request by the NNSA for Y-12 was for weapons activities.112 This funding allocation 
does not address the many thousands of canned sub-assemblies that are kept at the site 
without any justification for their potential future use.113 Instead, approximately $325 
million was allocated for the continuing development of a Uranium Processing Facility 
designed to produce new weapons components to keep pace with plutonium pit 
production at Los Alamos.114  
Despite multiple proposals to modernize the complex with facilities like the 
Uranium Processing Facility, Y-12 remains situated in a series of outdated facilities that 
have raised concerns about the security of the nuclear material stored there. In July 
2012 three protestors managed to penetrate into the most highly secured part of the site 
and paint messages on several walls in the facility.115 This event led to a reorganization 
of the site’s security management as well as ultimately contributing to the removal of its 
central contractor, B&W Y-12 (consisting of the Babcock and Wilcox company and the 
Bechtel Corporation). Along with the Pantex Plant, Y-12 is now slated to be managed 
by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, pending the litigation of several complaints 
about NNSA’s contract bidding process. The inefficient transition between managing 
contractors has paralleled inefficiencies in the construction of the Uranium Processing 
Facility which has seen its projected cost of construction increase dramatically from its 
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initially projected cost of just under $1 billion to anywhere between $6.5-19 billion.116 
These new cost estimates have led the NNSA to abandon the initial plans for 
constructing the Uranium Processing Facility in favor of distributing the capabilities the 
facility was meant to provide to other buildings on the Y-12 site. How this is possible 
given the dilapidated and aging facilities on the site is as of yet unclear.  
Y-12 has had a dramatic environmental impact throughout its operating years. 
The site has released eight times more mercury into the surrounding environment than 
was emitted by the entire United States in 1994 and 1995. While large sums are being 
spent on weapons activities and infrastructure at the site, there is little to no money 
allocated to fix the continued damage to the environment perpetrated by Y-12.117 The 
effects of mercury pollution and radioactive contamination from the site’s highly 
enriched uranium poses substantial health risks to approximately 700,000 people living 
within a 100-mile radius of the facility. Concerns have also been raised about the site’s 
relative vulnerability to an attack. A security exercise conducted by the NNSA in 2007 
concluded with mock attackers successfully stealing special nuclear material from Y-
12.118 Without substantial overhauls to the site both environmental and security 
concerns will make the maintenance of Y-12 a continually risky and harmful 
proposition.  
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Explaining the National Security Laboratories’ Drive for Modernized Nuclear 
Weapons 
It is important to note that obtaining detailed and consistent information about 
the funding for individual labs and the NNSA is incredibly difficult due to the manner 
in which each new funding request is segmented and presented. Not only are the funds 
for each lab allocated differently in each proposal, each contractor and their 
corresponding lab receive different percentages of each budget allocation. Due to these 
funding complications a statistical analysis of the growth in each lab’s funding is 
difficult, if not impossible, to conduct without speculation. However, all of the funding 
allocations indicate a disproportionate amount of spending on “weapons activities.” Of 
the entire budget, $6.339 billion is allocated to weapons activities, which already 
represents over half the total budget of the NNSA. Additionally, the construction or 
expansion of existing sites used to build weapons does not fall under the category of 
weapons activities. These activities at just Los Alamos and the Savannah River Site 
account for $1 billion in expenses. Given the $10.3 billion accounted for in the lab 
funding reports, weapons activities and the construction benefitting these activities 
accounts for over 70% of this total ($7.339 billion). The cost of Life Extension 
Programs is far less than the labs are currently being allocated, indicating that much of 
this excess money must be going to weapon modernization and the creation of new 
warheads. Modernization efforts represent the most expensive component of the 
NNSA’s activities and the funding breakdown at each lab consistently reflects an 




Because the labs draw so much funding from modernization programs, the labs 
and contractors that manage them have a vested interest in retaining their existing funds 
as well as obtaining more funding by arguing that modernizations are necessary for the 
security of the U.S. arsenal. Due to the fact that Congress currently sees funding for the 
labs as necessary only insofar as that funding will contribute to the nuclear arsenal, it 
makes sense that the labs argue that every program they pursue is essential to the 
security of the United States. Organization theory serves to explain the manner in which 
agencies pursue their own objectives separate from the overall objective of their 
government.119 Scott Sagan applies organization theory to nuclear proliferation in order 
to demonstrate that militaries and organizations in charge of nuclear weapons often 
make decisions that merely align with that organization’s objectives, rather than 
considering the necessity of those policies in a broader frame of deterrence.120 He 
isolates multiple historically examples in which the military actually pushed back 
against the development of more secure nuclear weapons because these developments 
would reduce the total amount of funding for the production of larger quantities of other 
weapons.  
While most of Sagan’s work deals with the effect of organizations on the 
decision to acquire nuclear weapons, his insights about the inflexible nature of 
organizations is highly relevant to the national security labs. Without some form of new 
overarching objective, the National Nuclear Security Administration will continue to 
pursue the same goal that it always has: securing funding for the design and 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. The need to consistently obtain equivalent or greater 
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levels of funding explains why the NNSA fights for every modernization program and 
attempts to create new weapons. Due to the nature of organizations to do their utmost to 
keep as much of their funding as possible, the best strategy for reorienting the labs is to 
present a new large-scale objective that would shift them away from nuclear 
modernization.  
 
Three Labs Are More Than Sufficient to Maintain Deterrence 
While these eight sites together have long been used to maintain their respective 
components of the U.S. nuclear arsenal they also task thousands of brilliant minds and 
allocate billions of dollars towards programs that are unnecessary to maintain a secure 
nuclear deterrent. If the consolidation of the functions of several facilities were a 
feasible option then the remaining national security laboratories could be tasked with 
solving problems unrelated to the nuclear arsenal. In a 2009 report, the National 
Resources Defense Council advocated shrinking the nuclear weapons complex to a total 
of three sites: Los Alamos, Sandia, and Pantex.121 Not only does the geographic 
proximity of these three sites resolve many of the security concerns associated with 
transporting nuclear materials over long distances, but the existing facilities at the three 
sites are already well situated for fulfilling the functions of other national security 
laboratories. Los Alamos has pit production and refurbishment capabilities as well as 
extensive experience with nuclear components. Sandia has manufactured non-nuclear 
components for nuclear weapons for many years and already collaborates closely with 
                                                        




Los Alamos. Pantex provides an ideal site for the testing of high explosives and the 
actual process of replacing outdated components in warheads to ensure their reliability. 
These three facilities together could function in a continued effort to reduce the 
size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile while making the remaining nuclear force more secure 
and reliable, according to the National Resources Defense Council Report. New 
warheads carry with them new security concerns and questions of reliability. 
Maintenance programs for the existing arsenal on the other hand can increase the 
security features on existing warheads at a significantly lower cost than what the 
development of a new warhead would entail.122 The National Resources Defense 
Council argues that Life Extension Programs should be used to reduce the total costs 
associated with the nuclear arsenal and that unnecessary nuclear weapons should be 
discarded rather than continuously modernized.123 Additionally, the report suggests that 
a consolidation of the labs into three facilities would facilitate much better oversight of 
the entirety of the nuclear stockpile and minimize unnecessary funding allocations.124 
By 2020, the report envisions the NNSA spending only $2.139 billion to maintain 
nuclear weapons, 17% of the 2015 allocation of $12.6 billion.125 This consolidation 
would be able to address problems with the existing nuclear arsenal and maintain the 
same levels of funding for these three labs given that they will need to take on many of 
the roles that other labs played in the LEPs for the nuclear arsenal.  
                                                        
122 Civiak, et al, “Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture,” 73-74. 
123 Civiak, et al, “Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture,” 76. 
124 Civiak, et al, “Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture,” 78. 




Repurposing the Labs for Climate Change Research Solves the 
Problem of Nuclear Modernization and Instead Benefits the U.S. and 
the World 
One of the largest threats facing the United States today is climate change. Top 
military leaders in the U.S. as well as public officials have reached a consensus on the 
potential for climate change to not only directly impact the U.S., but to act as a so-
called “threat multiplier” that could intensify other security threats.126 Large scale 
weather events and coastal flooding threaten cities across the U.S., and the recent surge 
in tropical storms along the east coast indicates that the early effects of climate change 
are already being felt in the U.S. While storms and coastal floods do not threaten the 
survival of the United States as a whole they do have drastic consequences for 
individual cities and areas of the country. Almost 50% of all Americans live within fifty 
miles of the coast and most of this segment of the population could be vulnerable to sea 
level rises and storms by 2040 at the latest.127 Flooding and weather events also have 
the capacity to damage U.S. military bases located in close proximity to the coast. The 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that multiple military bases could be 
entirely flooded in the event of a Category Three hurricane.128 These direct impacts on 
the U.S. alone illustrate the need for action to mitigate the coming effects of climate 
change. 
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Far more worrisome for the U.S. however are the potential international 
ramifications of rapid climate change. The potential destabilization of Indonesia 
coupled with a flood of refugees to already over-populated countries like India could 
result in large-scale political upheaval that would dwarf the existing refugee crisis in 
Europe.129 It is also possible that nations like China could change their political decision 
calculus given intensified climate impacts, prompting a readjustment in U.S. foreign 
policy.130 Climate change will also most likely destabilize already unstable countries in 
Africa and prompt further conflicts that could easily draw in the U.S. or other major 
powers. These conflagrations would pose a national security threat to the U.S. because 
of the potential rise of insurgencies similar to ISIS and the collapse of existing 
governments. Some degree of warming is absolutely inevitable, which means that the 
probability of conflict is extremely high. The U.S. military currently treats these 
potential scenarios as posing a significant threat to the future security of the United 
States because U.S. involvement in any of these conflicts would bring with it enormous 
human and financial costs.131  
These are only some of the impacts that climate change would have, but even 
the ones isolated above indicate a pressing need for mitigation and adaptation strategies 
on the part of the United States. Fortunately, the national security laboratories are very 
well suited to taking on a large-scale project central to U.S. security. Just as the 
Manhattan Project initially established the mission of the labs, a Climate Project could 
shift the mission of the labs away from their current trajectory of modernization towards 
climate mitigation technologies. The labs have already made multiple scientific 
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breakthroughs of incredible importance for new climate change technologies. Advances 
in superconductivity, a critical component of more energy-efficient solar cells and other 
energy storage mechanisms, were largely due to research done by the labs in condensed 
matter physics.132 The labs were also closely involved in the development of new high 
efficiency wind turbines and are currently in the process of researching a new 
generation of solar cells with greater capabilities.133 The labs already have much of the 
infrastructure in place to expand research on climate change. With the funds that could 
be freed up by abandoning modernization programs the labs could easily position 
themselves as the most prominent research institutions on climate change.  
One of the most promising projects in climate change research currently is 
carbon capture and storage, which would have the ability to actively reduce carbon in 
the atmosphere by storing it underground. Scientists estimate that if an effective CCS 
program was the only technology deployed to combat climate change given the current 
trajectory of emissions, it could stabilize CO2 levels at their current state for 100 
years.134 In conjunction with emissions reductions and other technologies CCS could 
prevent potential future harmful warming loops that would result from the release of 
methane from the Arctic permafrost, as well as provide a greater time window for the 
development of renewable energy.135 Although CCS has incredible potential, it has not 
received major attention or funding that would facilitate its large-scale deployment. 
This is in large part due to the lack of incentives for companies to conduct research on 
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CCS, as well as a perception that the ultimate implementation of CCS will be 
prohibitively expensive.136  
While the Department of Energy has funded research into CCS, its funding 
efforts have been meager and insufficient. Between 1997 and 2008 the DoE spent just 
$900 million to incentivize technological advancements in the technology. Since 2009, 
the DoE has spent an additional $3.38 billion on both research as well as 
implementation studies, bringing the total investment in CCS to just over $4 billion.137 
This sum is insufficient to incentivize widespread research into CCS as the prime 
technology to combat climate change. Additionally, the DoE’s funding does not cover 
the potential costs of actually implementing the technology in the future. Many experts 
argue that the actual process of capturing carbon from the atmosphere would represent 
70-80% of the cost of the technology, and the DoE does nothing to address this 
potential future cost.138 To make matters worse, funding for CCS decreased by almost 
$100 million from 2013 to 2014, indicating that the DoE is de-prioritizing the 
technology in its funding allocation. Putting existing funding in perspective, the yearly 
budget for fossil fuel research and development is $125 million more than that of CCS, 
even though the former amplifies global warming instead of having the capacity to 
diminish it.139 
 If just the B61-12 modernization program was cut and the funds reallocated to 
the development of carbon capture and storage at the national security labs there would 
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be an additional $11.6 billion spent on CCS.140 This sum is almost three times what has 
been spent on developing CCS since 1997 and would even likely be able to cover the 
potential costs of implementing CCS. Additionally, further research into increasing the 
efficiency of carbon dioxide capture would have the potential to decrease the total cost 
of the technology by almost 50%, making implementation even more feasible.141 The 
labs no longer involved in the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent have unique 
capabilities that would allow them to take on this new challenge. The Kansas City Plant, 
for example, has previously researched more efficient ways to store solar energy and to 
reduce the overall costs of energy storage. Many of the scientists employed at the plant 
focus on designing efficient components for use in nuclear weapons, but have also 
utilized this same expertise for non-nuclear applications. Freed from its attachment to 
the nuclear arsenal, the Kansas City Plant could become a major hub for CCS research 
designed to reduce the overall costs of the technology. Other labs that currently 
specialize in producing components for the nuclear arsenal could use their facilities to 
manufacture components for CCS instead, and the technology could go from its 
theoretical stage to implementation rapidly.  
Cutting just one modernization program and repurposing the funds contained 
within that program could result in the implementation of one of the most promising 
technologies to combat climate change. If every modernization program was cut and 
reallocated in this way climate change research would receive a boost of several 
hundred billion dollars over the next decade. Researchers at the labs would be able to 
pursue projects that fit their area of expertise, resulting in a number of new minds in the 
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field of climate research as well. A large-scale shift in the mission of the labs would 
result in an extraordinary contribution to solving the most pressing problem facing the 
world. Additionally, the perception that the U.S. is shifting its efforts from nuclear 
modernization to climate change research has the potential to be modeled by other 
nations around the world. Instead of prompting other powers to build up their own 
arsenals, a repurposed NNSA that focuses on climate change would likely make other 
nations far more willing to cooperate on both arms control as well as climate change 
issues. As illustrated earlier, countries are proceeding with their modernization efforts 
because of the U.S. commitment to a modernized arsenal. If U.S. modernization was 
halted, other nations would most likely no longer feel a need to modernize their own 
arsenals for security purposes, and could re-purpose their own organizations in charge 






Nuclear modernization is an expensive proposition that currently serves to 
justify the missions of the eight national security laboratories. From the current 
standpoint of the NNSA, the only way to secure new funding is to propose excessive 
and expensive modernization programs. These costly programs serve to undermine 
international security. However, halting the harmful push for modernization would 
enable funding at the national security laboratories to be deployed in productive ways 
that could harness some of the nation’s best and brightest scientists in collective 
research projects with tangible global benefits. It is neither necessary nor prudent to 
continue having all of the labs focus on nuclear modernization and refurbishment when 
three labs would be more than sufficient to maintain a stable deterrent. Consolidating 
the duty of maintaining the arsenal to three labs allows the other labs to utilize their 
existing funding for modernization efforts to pursue highly beneficial technologies such 
as carbon capture and storage. Greater research into technologies to combat climate 
change is essential if the United States is to successfully confront the impacts that 
climate change will have in the future. 
With a shift in their organizational mission, the labs could become a force for 
good in the international community. Instead of artificially creating unnecessary 
projects to inflate their funding, the labs could use the funds that they would have spent 
on destructive technologies in order to develop productive and beneficial technologies. 
The NNSA as an organization is concerned with obtaining the funding that it needs to 
justify its continued organizational existence. As long as there is money that allows the 




to the organization. With a complete shift in the organizational mission of the NNSA 
without any reduction in funding the NNSA could transition to climate change research. 
This would enable other nations to also shift their own efforts away from modernization 
and towards dealing with climate change. There is no conceivable reason that the U.S. 
needs eight laboratories working on the nuclear arsenal. Instead of working on 
programs that move the world closer to nuclear devastation, the labs should pursue 
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